Armed conflict devastates a country, straining its institutions to their limits and beyond, shattering the foundations of its economy, and causing immeasurable human suffering and loss. It also calls into question the country’s very ability to exist, posing fundamental questions about its worth and capabilities. Why is this happening to us? Will we survive this? How will we ever go forward after such a blow? These are questions that inevitably accompany a losing war or even one with an ambiguous outcome.

If the conflict does not last too long, if the damage does not exceed the capacity of the country to repair itself, and if the population can maintain its cohesion and some sense of hope, then a country can reemerge even from significant devastation. Once the dust has settled, it might even learn a productive lesson from what has happened and emerge stronger than it was before the conflict. Such an outcome will depend on many factors, but key among them is one that we often ignore, take for granted, or underestimate: culture.

All would-be nation-builders know that a country emerging from conflict needs an army, a police force, schools, a constitution and laws, elections and a new government. But to get traction and become part of a new and healthy national fabric, these elements can’t just float in space as good ideas imported from the outside and funded by the benign victor or a generous international community. They have to be grafted onto something with durability and longevity, and that something is the country’s culture. Culture says: “Our ancestors have survived this and more, and so can we.” It says: “However demolished and lowly we may appear at this moment, we have something of value to contribute to the world.” And it says: “We belong together, and jointly we must overcome what happened and move forward in a better way.”

The problem is that culture itself does not emerge unscathed from a conflict. Quite the opposite: war inflicts heavy damage both to tangible symbols of heritage such as historic buildings or monuments and to the intangible expressions such as traditions, ethical norms, literature, and art.

During extreme moments, when basic physical survival is at risk and people are dying in the streets, culture can seem a luxury item. But it is more than opera tickets and reading groups; it is the totality of qualities, beliefs, values, symbols, and practices, large and small, that together add up to a unique way of life, to the collective being and personality of a group, country, or population. For social entities, culture represents survival in linear time, a link to the past, a vision for the future, and a compelling reason to continue to walk that path together.

As the physical manifestations of culture, heritage sites particularly are often targeted during war precisely because of their psychological, religious, and economic saliency, and because of the demoralization caused by their destruction. Bomb a mosque, cathedral, medieval fortress, or Renaissance theater that holds pride of place in someone’s history, and you strike a killing blow.

People instinctively know how tragic the loss of their culture is; that is why an attack on a cherished edifice causes a visceral reaction, just as it explains the impulse of revolutionary crowds, who seem driven as their first action after victory to topple the statues or monuments honoring the overthrown dictator and the authoritarian rule that oppressed them. This impulse is deeply anchored in human behavior—visitors to ancient Egyptian tombs and monuments can view the scratched-out names of controversial queens and pharaohs who, upon being displaced, were subjected to a process of obliteration aimed at erasing them and their entire epoch from history. And certainly Islamic extremists today understand the significance of monuments, which is why they try to destroy anything that speaks of achievements prior to Islam, or challenges their own intended cultural primacy. The Taliban was not just acting from casual malice in 2001 when they dynamited the glorious Buddha statues carved into the cliffs of the Bamiyan Valley in central Afghanistan. These had to go because in their very magnitude and permanence they stood as a powerful silent rebuke to the lack of cultural accomplishments or abilities of Mullah Omar’s ragtag band of terrorists and the worldview they espouse.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared on World Affairs.

Resolving Argentina’s cyberspace dispute with Patagonia falls to the little known but influential Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). ICANN met this month in Beijing to update its policies and discuss potential additions to the global catalog of domain names, including .patagonia, .amazon, .search, and .book, to name a few.

No single person, company, organization, or other body controls the Internet. What technology can be used online, what goods and services can be sold by whom, and what videos get uploaded to which sites are decided by a combination of civil society groups, governments, inter-governmental organizations, and network operators. This multi-stakeholder model promotes the open flow of information, innovation, and the growth of the Internet.

ICANN will decide who will manage the .patagonia domain (and whether or not to even create it) by following a set of policies that embody the multi-stakeholder model and balance the interests of government, business, and civil society worldwide.

ICANN is a crucial player in international Internet governance because it manages the worldwide allocation of Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses — the numbers that identify an actual Internet site — and associated website names within the Domain Name System (“DNS”). ICANN also authorizes domain registries (equivalent to wholesalers), such as Verisign, Inc., to manage generic top-level domain names (“gTLDs”), such as .com, .net, .org, etc. The registry, in turn, works with retailers, known as registrars (such as godaddy.com) to allocate specific domain names (e.g. www.theatlantic.com) to individual consumers.

ICANN was created in 1998 to internationalize management of key aspects of the Internet that were previously overseen by the U.S. government. It receives its formal authority from the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”) functions contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce. Today, ICANN is a private non-profit organization headquartered in Marina del Rey, California, and governed by an internationally selected board of directors. It is assisted by several advisory committees and supporting organizations that represent the full range of Internet constituencies – from governments to web companies.

Debate over control of the .patagonia domain arose during ICANN’s recent push to authorize new gTLDs to complement the existing ones. Creation of the new domains will allow for greater Internet innovation, increase competition in the registry space, and expand the existing namespace for domain names. ICANN is currently overseeing an application process whereby interested companies and individuals, such as Patagonia, pay an application fee to apply to operate a new gTLD of its choosing. If more than one applicant applies for the same domain, an auction will be held. The application process includes multiple levels of review that ensure all stakeholders, including governments, have a voice in deciding which new gTLDs are assigned and to whom.

At the Beijing Conference, ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee — the principal voice of national governments within the institution — recommended that ICANN freeze consideration of several gTLDs, including .patagonia and .amazon because certain governments objected to them.

Argentina may face an uphill battle because “Patagonia” does not fall cleanly within the definition of a geographic domain, which would allow Argentina to block Patagonia’s application. According to ICANN’s guidebook, applicants for geographic gTLDs are required to have the relevant local government’s support of their application (or, at least, a lack of objection).

To qualify as a geographic domain, the proposed address must include the name of: a city, a sub-national unit of a country (e.g. a state, county, or province), a UNESCO region name (e.g. a continent or region), or country name. Purchasing .texas or .asia, for instance, would not fly.

According to ICANN’s guidelines, it appears that Patagonia Inc. should be able to buy .patagonia. Patagonia has managed the patagonia.com domain and maintained global trademarks for the “Patagonia” without incident. It is a sub-region within Argentina made up of five provinces (that crosses into Chile), but it does not appear on any the lists described above, so it does not appear to violate ICANN standards on geographic domain names. Yet Argentina can still object to ICANN’s Geographic Names Panel and ask it to intervene on its behalf. Chile has joined suit, objecting to the granting of the .patagonia domain, too.

Amazon.com, Inc. also attracted attention for its bid for the .amazon domain. None of the countries that form the Amazon basin (e.g. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, or Venezuela) have formally objected yet, but initial indications are that Brazil and Peru likely will. If Brazil were to do so, it would likely be able to block the gTLD from being issued because it has a state named Amazonas, which is very similar to the full domain name being sought by Amazon.com.

ICANN makes policy through a bottom-up, consensus-based processes that includes input from the worldwide Internet community. By working by consensus, ICANN sometimes sacrifices expediency for the sake of inclusiveness and comprehensive deliberation. The openness of ICANN – which allows members of the public to directly address its Board — stands in sharp contrast to the lack of transparency at the closed meetings of United Nations-affiliated fora that seek to play a role in Internet governance. While cumbersome, the alternative to ICANN’s approach — allowing governments, or another single group, to unilaterally manage the Internet – risks erosion of Internet freedoms.

Argentina may not prevail in its opposition to Patagonia’s application, but it will have a voice in ICANN’s deliberations. Whatever the result, ICANN’s processes continue to show the benefits of the multi-stakeholder model and its importance to the future of the Internet.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared on The Atlantic.

Deciding to name and shame China openly is a significant step in US cybersecurity policy and has international repercussions: It forces the two countries to address the issue publicly, and shines a spotlight on the cyberactivity of other countries, including the United States. This may increase pressure on governments and companies to act more forcefully against cyber-espionage attacks.

Of course, China is not the only country that has committed, or will commit, cyber-espionage. Indeed, China has accused the US of cyberattacks and recently described itself as a leading victim of hacking attacks. The full scope of international cyberattacks is hard to define because of the challenge of identifying who launched an attack, and the absence of a coordinated, global effort to find out who the hostile cyberactors are.

To navigate this new diplomatic landscape and successfully protect its own cybersecurity interests, the US needs a proactive cyber foreign policy that goes beyond naming and shaming. Here are four steps the US can take to bolster its diplomatic efforts to address cybersecurity threats.

1. Start where countries agree

International rules governing cybersecurity are unclear, particularly when it comes to cyber-espionage. That’s because technology is changing rapidly and countries disagree over principles on issues like privacy rights and Internet freedom. Countries are also unwilling to sacrifice their own right to act unilaterally in cyberspace.

One step to start holding countries accountable for cyberattacks is to solidify norms that are already implicitly agreed on. For example, it seems that countries, for the most part, have not hacked into each other’s financial institutions nor disrupted predominantly civilian critical infrastructure. The US should explore past norms in areas such as arms control to derive lessons for cybernorms.

Washington must also engage the private sector in this dialogue, even though some business interests have opposed the administration’s legislative efforts to improve cybersecurity standards.

The private sector owns and operates the majority of the critical infrastructure that the government wants to protect. US-based multinationals have a vested interest in secure, stable cyberspace and can be useful partners in advocating for norms internationally.

2. Enlist the support of allies

Help from friends and countries with common interests is critical to the success of Washington’s new cyberpolicy, just as it is with any other national security policy. It is even more important in this instance, however, because cyberspace transcends borders and is not controlled by any single state. The US should encourage allies to name and shame China, which has undoubtedly hacked networks in their territory, too, and to do the same with other cyber-espionage aggressors.

A coalition could begin with just a handful of countries such as Britain, Australia, Germany,Canada, South Korea, and Japan. It could issue a public statement announcing agreed-upon principles. These allies could put in place a set of voluntary accountability and verification mechanisms to build trust and ensure compliance with the group’s basic principles.

The group could attract more members by offering expanded technical assistance to enhance countries’ cybersecurity. Creating such a group would lend US cyberefforts greater international legitimacy and motivate countries to work together against threats.

3. Be more proactive

Assembling friendly states and developing a set of global norms would give the US more leverage over China, Russia, Iran, and other cyberoffenders that regularly hijack international Internet governance meetings. For example, at the December 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications, the US and other like-minded nations struggled to defeat the myriad troubling proposals offered by Russia that empowered states to clamp down on Internet freedoms. Eventually, 55 countries, led by the US, refused to sign the agreement.

This tense dynamic is not sustainable. Instead of being on defense, the US must be at the forefront of setting the international agenda. The US could focus positively on common ground, and put those who oppose Internet freedom on defense.

4. Communicate clearly

Washington needs to be transparent about its policy decisions so that it can communicate clearly to allies and adversaries alike.

Specifically, the US must consider these questions: What constitutes an attack? What kinds of economic espionage or attacks against the private sector will trigger government intervention? Will the US pursue a policy of deterrence, which requires specifying credible countermeasures – or leave itself more room to maneuver as conflicts in cyberspace evolve?

The administration took a significant step last September, when the State Department described central tenets of US policy on cyberconflict. The Department of Defense recently announced it is creating offensive and defensive cyberteams to protect the US. But officials from both departments acknowledge unresolved questions.

The US should advocate for global rules for cyberconduct, convince friends to embrace them, and push these rules as part of a more proactive cyber-agenda. This approach will solidify American leadership in cyberspace, foster international cooperation, and discourage cyberattacks.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared on Christian Science Monitor.

With the 10th anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the War in Iraq) approaching, it is a good time to reflect on the lesser-known and ongoing U.S. military deployments overseas. According to the Department of Defense, the U.S. deployed 172,966 active duty military personnel to over 150 countries in 2012. And that’s excluding those deployed in Afghanistan for direct combat operations.

Numerous contractors and other support personnel increase the size of this footprint. And deployment of special operations forces — often on classified missions — further expands the U.S. military’s presence around the globe. After all, the War on Terror catalyzed the rapid expansion of the U.S. Special Operations Command, which is now roughly the same size as Canada’s entire active duty military.

Below is an overview of five countries where the U.S. armed forces are active that you may have forgotten — or not know about:

1. Cuba

Roughly 1,000 military personnel are based at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which is the U.S.’s oldest naval base and the only one located in a country with which the U.S does not have diplomatic relations. Since the end of the Cold War, the base was used primarily for its port facilities, refueling, and naval operations in the Caribbean (e.g. humanitarian and natural disaster response). And except for its depiction in the 1992 hit film A Few Good Men, Guantanamo Bay did not receive much public attention until 2002, when it began being used to hold suspected enemy combatants and terrorists.

Today, the headlines may be fewer and farther between, but the controversy still burns. In late 2010, Congress stymied the Obama Administration’s efforts to close the facilities and transfer the custody of detainees to U.S. civilian courts. As a result, the military detention facilities remain in use and trials have commenced.

2. Honduras

In Honduras, the U.S. has roughly 500 personnel at Soto Cano Airbase as part of Joint Task Force-Bravo. These forces focus on joint training with Central American militaries, counter-drug operations, and humanitarian response and disaster relief. Honduras suffers one of the highest homicide rates anywhere in the world (roughly 92 per 100,000 inhabitants) and its government is struggling to address the serious threat posed by transnational organized crime.

A contingent of U.S. Navy Seals recently completed a deployment to Honduras to help the country create its ownelite maritime special forces unit to combat drug traffickers.  U.S. military forces apparently play a more pure training role than their law enforcement counterparts from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), whom have accompanied Honduran forces on raids and killed suspected traffickers during those operations.

3. The Philippines

The U.S. has maintained a military presence in the Philippines since the end of the Spanish American War. Today, there are about 700 U.S. personnel stationed in the island nation. Washington handed back its two largest military facilities in the country — Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station — to the Philippines government in the early 1990’s, but recently reached an agreement that will allow their limited use by U.S. forces. The current U.S. deployment focuses on counter-terrorism training and operations against Philippines-based militants, such as Abu Sayyaf and other Al-Qaeda affiliated groups.

An expansion of that relationship was announced in late 2012, and will increase the numbers of U.S. ships, aircraft, and troops transiting through the Philippines in an apparent attempt to check China’s influence in the South China Sea. However, an emboldened — and increasingly public — U.S. presence is not always welcomed by the Philippine public. In January 2013, U.S. minesweeper ran aground on a protected reef in the Southern Philippines, igniting a strong backlash against the U.S.

4. Djibouti

Camp Lemonnier — a former French Foreign Legion outpost on the outskirts of Djibouti City — is now home to roughly 3,200 U.S. military personnel and contractors, including 300 special operations staff. With a growing presence of militants in places like Somalia and Yemen, experts predict that Camp Lemonnier will remain in the headlines. It is the largest American base in Africa and a major drone hub for missions in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, several of the drones that participated in the strike that killed Anwar Al-Awlaki — the senior Al-Qaeda operative (and U.S. citizen) — reportedly launched from Camp Lemonnier.

The entire facility is reportedly dedicated to special operations missions, including training foreign militaries and intelligence gathering, which is quite rare among U.S. foreign outposts. The Pentagon is planning to significantly increase the base’s size, with $1.3 billion in construction projects over the next two decades. This signals Washington’s interest in building up the U.S.’s military presence in Djibouti in years to come.

5. Niger

Last month, President Obama notified Congress that he is in the process of dispatching 100 service members –— principally Air Force specialists, intelligence analysts, and security personnel — to Niger, to gather intelligence on Al-Qaeda affiliated militants in Mali and neighboring countries. This deployment focuses on the use of reconnaissance drones to support French forces, which deployed to Mali in late 2012 after militants overran the Northern half of the country.

The U.S. has limited assets in Africa, especially in the Sahara. In addition, Camp Lemonnier is over 3,000 miles East, too far to make drone operations effective. Niger figures to be an increasingly important country of focus in combating Al-Qaeda in Africa.

Conclusion

The upcoming 10th anniversary of the War in Iraq will call attention to U.S. military forces overseas. Washington deploys forces to the majority of all countries worldwide, including Cuba, Honduras, the Philippines, Djibouti, and Niger. As the War on Terror continues, the creation of new special operations-focused bases near regional hot-spots (e.g. Camp Lemonnier) and the deployment of “small footprint,” specialized teams to gather intelligence (e.g. Niger) are likely to increase.

The sequester and looming budget battle, however, may dampen the Pentagon’s ability to continue its robust foreign deployment and force decision-makers to choose which foreign missions are most critical to protecting U.S. national security.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared on PolicyMic.

Here’s a deeper look at the key players around the negotiating table, which may lend insight into how the talks will progress.

1. Iran

Iran is represented by Dr. Saeed Jalili, a soft-spoken, yet hard-line, Iranian politician who has served as Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and lead nuclear negotiator since 2007. He is reportedly a favorite of Iran’s Supreme Leader, who approved his appointment to his current position and values his loyalty. In 2005, he rose from more junior positions Iran’s Foreign Ministry to serve as an adviser to President Ahmadinejad, an old personal friend, and deputy foreign minister for European and American Affairs. He previously served in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps on the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War, where he suffered a serious leg injury that forced his retirement from the military.

Jalili’s name is increasingly mentioned as a possible successor to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which has put him front and center in Iran’s domestic political struggle between its Supreme Leader and current president. Western interlocutors describe him as ideologically rigid, overly theoretical and academic, and an apparatchik of the Iranian regime.

2. The U.S.

Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, is representing the U.S. She manages day-to-day regional policy issues and is the Department’s point person on Iran. A political appointee with a close relationship to the Clintons, she previously served as State Department counselor and policy coordinator for North Korea and assistant secretary of legislative affairs under President Clinton.

Sherman is a fixture of the democratic foreign policy community and has also served on the Department of Defense’s Defense Policy Board, the Congressionally-appointed Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism, and as chair of the Board of Oxfam America. Sherman is reportedly staying in her current position and will not be immediately replaced 3/4 in contrast to other under secretaries of state.

3. Great Britain, France, and Germany

Baroness Catherine Ashton is a U.K. Labour Party politician who represents the U.K., France, and Germany at the P5+1 talks in her capacity as the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. She concurrently serves as vice president of the European Commission and oversees the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Ashton previously served as EU trade commissioner and as leader of the U.K. House of Lords. Relatively unknown in European foreign policy circles before her appointment as High Representative in 2009, she held various political positions in the U.K., including in the Ministry of Justice and Department of Education during Prime Minister Blair’s government.

4. China

China is represented in Almaty by Assistant Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu, who has responsibility for international organizations and arms control. A career diplomat and former debate champion, he previously served at several overseas diplomatic posts, including the Chinese Mission to the UN in New York, the Chinese Embassy in the U.K., and the Chinese Embassy and Mission to the EU in Brussels. He was appointed to his current position in late 2011 after serving most recently as director general of information and foreign ministry spokesperson. He represented China at previous P5+1 negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, including in Baghdad in May 2012.

5. Russia

Finally, Russia is represented by Sergei Ryabkov, a career Russian diplomat who has served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2008. He previously served for six years in senior positions at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and as director of the Foreign Ministry Department of European Cooperation. In statements leading up to today’s talks, Ryabkov expressed optimism about significant progress being achieved and cautioned against allowing long gaps like the eight month hiatus between the May 2012 talks and February 2013 talks, which could slow progress of future talks.

The venue of today’s talks is symbolic, because Kazakhstan proactively gave up the large nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. While the outcome remains unclear, the key negotiators are all veterans of the P5+1 discussions and know the importance of their task.

Hopefully, Iran — and its lead negotiator Saeed Jalili — will respond constructively to a joint offer from the P5+1 to hold future talks focused on finding ways for Iran to ease tensions with the international community.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared on PolicyMic.

Sadr first made a name for himself as an erratic demagogue who stoked sectarian fighting and helped bring Iraq’s young democracy to its knees. From 2003 to 2008, Sadr’s Mahdi Army took up arms against successive Iraqi governments and committed widespread atrocities against the country’s Sunni minority, in addition to targeting U.S. installations and personnel until American forces left Iraq at the end of 2011.

Then, last spring, he abruptly changed course, and he has spent the past year reforming his image and serving as a voice of moderation in Iraq. Sadr now openly decries violence, advocates the peaceful resolution of Iraq’s political disputes, and prays with religious leaders from other faiths and sects.

On the one hand, Sadr’s new tune could reflect his genuine maturation and a newfound desire to play a positive role in Iraq’s dysfunctional political system; on the other hand, it could be just a new tactic to expand his influence and power. Either way, the more Sadr can convince Iraqis — disenfranchised Shia, Kurds, and Sunnis alike — that he is a reliable and moderate partner, the more power he will accrue at the expense of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, also a Shiite. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and Kurds face a tough choice, because working with Sadr could lead to two very different outcomes. Joining him to challenge Maliki could perhaps promote a more inclusive political process, but it could also re-empower the rule of sectarian militias. The key for Iraqis is to vet the new Sadr carefully and insist that he backs his sweetened rhetoric with concrete actions.

THE PRODIGAL SON RETURNS

Sadr hails from a family of distinguished clerics with a long history of political activism. Both his uncle, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a prominent religious philosopher, and his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a senior cleric, were killed by Saddam Hussein’s government. Sadr himself first appeared on the political stage in the summer of 2003. His oratory, which drew upon hate speech and conspiracy theories, resonated with disenfranchised Shia, who quickly became his base of support.

Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army — along with Sunni counterparts in al Qaeda — was responsible for much of the sectarian bloodletting that plagued Iraq from 2005 to 2008. The Mahdi Army terrorized large parts of Iraq’s center and south, and it pursued bloody purges of Sunni neighborhoods throughout Baghdad. During this period, Sadr did not hide his views or actions. Indeed, he was once recorded bragging about his ability to kill Sunnis under religious cover provided by Shia clerics. Between 2006 and 2008, he openly challenged Maliki’s government for control of Basra, Karbala, Maysan, and several neighborhoods in Baghdad, thereby precipitating a large-scale military confrontation with the government. His offensive was ultimately unsuccessful.

Anticipating defeat following the United States’ implementation of the “surge” strategy in 2007, Sadr left for Iran and stayed there for four years in self-imposed exile. Sadr’s relations with Maliki have oscillated more than once between direct military confrontation and close political cooperation. He returned to Iraq in early 2011 with a newfound confidence, following elections in which his faction won an impressive 40 seats in the new parliament. Upon returning, Sadr maintained a defiant tone and sought to leverage his sway in the parliament to force the appointment of a weak and malleable prime minister. But Maliki’s persistence, coupled with Iran’s fear of fracturing the Shia alliance in Iraq, compelled Sadr to grudgingly help Maliki win a second term in office. Without Sadr’s support, Maliki would have lost the premiership. Sadr proceeded to transform his party into the linchpin of Maliki’s coalition government, thereby challenging the Kurdish parties as the kingmaker in Baghdad.

But Sadr has not had an easy time influencing Maliki. On the contrary, Maliki has used his new term to splinter the Sunni opposition, marginalize the Kurds, and otherwise consolidate his power. To do so, the prime minister has combined threats and a selective application of the law against his opponents, including a politically motivated show trial for terrorism charges against former Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni. Meanwhile, Maliki also pushed aside Sadr and the various Shia parties. Together, these developments generated a backlash against the prime minister and complaints of a new dictatorship taking root in Baghdad.

A MODERATE MAKEOVER

Against this backdrop, Sadr began to change his stripes. In 2012, he started by distancing himself from Iran, deflecting blame for previous sectarian violence onto other Iran-backed groups, particularly Asaib Ahl al-Haq — a Mahdi Army splinter group that broke away and supported Maliki. Last April, Sadr publically joined the president of Kurdistan’s regional government, Massoud Barzani, and the leader of the Sunni-backed Iraqiya coalition, Ayad Allawi, to denounce Maliki’s policies as autocratic and demand a vote of no confidence against the prime minister. He was explicit about his reasons for doing so, saying: “[T]he acts of marginalization . . . and politicizing the judiciary . . . lead to a dictatorship [and] . . . using the armed forces or the judiciary to eliminate [opponents] are two sides of the same coin.”

In December 2012, Sadr again demonstrated his new stance. That month, several Sunni-majority provinces erupted in protest against perceived injustices inflicted by Maliki’s government. Sadr rushed to lend his support to the protesters — who hailed from the very same communities that his militia had butchered in previous years — and endorsed nearly all of their demands. He even went so far as to make a very rare public appearance in which he prayed alongside Sunni clerics in one of Baghdad’s landmark Sunni mosques, and he subsequently paid a visit to one of Baghdad’s churches that was targeted in a deadly attack in 2010.

He now frequently issues written statements that are much more tolerant toward non-Shia and, arguably, quite reasonable. “[Y]ou cannot fight sectarianism with more sectarianism,” he wrote to Sunni protesters in December 2012. These words indicate a commitment to inclusiveness and nonviolence, but they come from the same man whose followers, just a few years ago, routinely killed and pillaged their sectarian enemies.

Now that the U.S. has withdrawn from Iraq, the Sunnis have been sidelined both politically and militarily, and the Kurds are anxious to find a Shia partner other than Maliki, Sadr sees an opportunity to return to the political scene and succeed where he previously failed. Several factors are driving this new, moderate approach. For one, Sadr’s military forces are weak and cannot afford another open confrontation with the government of Iraq. Because the balance of power has shifted considerably against Sadr, he must now win hearts and minds if he wants political power. His revised message of moderation and inclusion seeks to take advantage of widespread public disillusionment with Maliki’s government.

Moreover, Sadr’s political movement has been fragmenting over the past five years. Sadr fears that Maliki will marginalize him, too, once he is done with the Sunni Arabs. Meanwhile, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the group that splintered away from Sadr’s Mahdi Army, is creating its own political party to challenge Sadr for the backing of his core constituency. Sadr’s challenge, therefore, is to find a way to retain his base of support, while also attracting new followers in time for Iraq’s next provincial and general elections, in April 2013 and early 2014, respectively.

Ultimately, it is probable that Sadr views himself as a possible successor to Iraq’s most influential Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. In order to be perceived as such, Sadr needs to jettison his violent reputation. Securing such a position would enable him to take a more hands-on role in politics and infuse greater clerical oversight into the Iraqi political scene.

THE ROAD TO REDEMPTION

From the perspective of Maliki’s rivals, Sadr’s new persona presents a conundrum. If they embrace the new Sadr, they risk empowering a former enemy with blood on his hands. But if they reject him, it is possible that he will return to his old, violent ways. Iraqis would be wise to assess the sincerity of Sadr’s inclusive tone. There are a number of conceivable litmus tests. For starters, Iraqis should urge Sadr to broaden his movement into a cross-sectarian party that welcomes non-Shia members. Actively including Kurds, Sunnis, and other groups would signal to all ethnic minorities and sects that Sadr views them as equals, not inferior heretics.

On Sadr’s part, he could mollify his skeptics by demonstrating his commitment to the Iraqi constitution and the rule of law. One way of doing so would be to help Sunni Arabs and Kurds pass legislation on the functioning of Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court (comparable to the U.S. Supreme Court), which has been held hostage by fundamentalists’ demands to allow sharia scholars to possess veto power over legislation. Supporting such legislation would help demonstrate that Sadr believes in Iraq’s constitution and its emphasis on power sharing among factions.

Furthermore, Sadr could try to win Sunni Arabs’ trust by approaching the question of de-Baathification (the process of purging members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party from political positions) in an impartial fashion. Previously, Sadr demanded amnesty for, and secured the release of, hundreds of detained Shia militiamen as part of his bargain to support Maliki for another term. But Sadr continues to voice strong opposition to the reintegration of former Baath officials into Iraqi society. By punishing Sunnis for past abuses more than Shia, Sadr has undermined political reconciliation in Iraq.

Finally, to win the Kurds’ trust, Sadr could offer support for their causes, namely, a more robust role for regions and provinces in the development of oil and gas resources, a more equitable distribution of energy profits, and control over disputed territories. In this vein, Sadr could join the Kurdish parties in parliament to push through new hydrocarbon-investment and revenue-sharing laws that could resolve the chronic and destabilizing disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over energy contracts and budget allocations. The Iraqiya bloc, the Kurds, and the Sadrists previously succeeded in defeating Maliki in parliament when he attempted to dissolve the country’s independent High Election Commission in 2011, so it is conceivable that the three blocs could jointly muster enough votes to pass other laws, too.

Will Sadr continue his surprising transformation from a violent, sectarian demagogue to an advocate for inclusive dialogue? His past record of killing civilians, military confrontation against the Iraqi government, and attacking U.S. personnel necessarily brings into question the credibility of this fresh persona. Nevertheless, his revised tone could also reflect an honest change in ideology and objectives that bodes well for Iraq’s democratic transition. Iraqis would be wise to welcome Sadr’s new message with caution, and they should press him to prove his sincerity through concrete actions, not just words.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article was co-authored by Omar al-Nidawi. It originally appeared on Foreign Policy.

1. People-to-People Diplomacy

Clinton understands the importance of strengthening ties with friends and allies while simultaneously engaging adversaries. Through intensive personal interaction, she has deftly built new relationships and managed old ones in a way that advance U.S. interests. In her own words, she has endeavored to ensure that the U.S. has “…a seat at every table that has the potential for being a partnership to solve problems.” For example, she expertly led efforts to rescue Chen Guangcheng, the dissident who took refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in May 2012, without crippling U.S.-China relations. Clinton has been the most active secretary of state in history, as a result. She has traveled more frequently and visited more countries than any of her predecessors; to date, her travels have spanned nearly 1 million miles and 112 countries.

2. The Importance of Economics

Clinton articulated a new vision of Economic Statecraft that made domestic economic growth – e.g. helping U.S. companies win business overseas – a key pillar of U.S. foreign policy. She made foreign policy relevant to the broader economic conversation, taking place in the U.S. in a show of political savvy few previous secretaries could match. And Clinton appointed the State Department’s first ever-chief economist to help implement Clinton’s vision. She also supported the more traditional economic aspects of foreign policy – such as sanctions – including those that crippled the Iranian government – and free trade – including Free Trade Agreements with allies Panama, Colombia, and South Korea.

3. Restoring American Credibility

Building on people-to-people diplomacy, Clinton has promoted U.S. values in a firm but respectful way that restored international faith in the U.S. that eroded during the Bush administration. Her outreach to Burma balances unwavering support for human rights with the promise of support to a previously suspicious regime and has opened that country to the world for the first time in decades. Aung San Suu Kyi is now free and her party actively participating in the governance reform effort in Burma. Clinton also rejuvenated U.S. engagement in the Middle East by brokering a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel earlier this year. Her shuttle diplomacy and coordination with Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi will likely give the U.S. greater leverage to pursue a robust peace process in 2013.

4. Diplomacy is National Security

The now iconic picture of senior officials gathered in the Situation Room during the Osama Bin Laden raid will forever memorialize one of the principal national security achievements of the first Obama administration. Clinton supported the raid and was a key player in adjusting U.S.-Pakistan relations afterwards. She was also a strong proponent of NATO airstrikes in Libya that eventually led to Muammar Gaddafi’s ouster. Her active diplomacy was critical to securing United Nations Security Council authorization of the Libya mission and maintaining strong European and regional support for it. Without such robust diplomatic effort, the use of military force – in Pakistan and Libya – would not have been nearly as effective. Clinton’s role in these two military campaigns highlights the central role foreign policy plays in U.S. national security in the 21^stcentury.

5. Texts From Hillary

In 2012, Clinton became an internet sensation because of a series of memes depicting her having fictitious, comical text exchanges with other celebrities while wearing her trademark sunglasses. Texts from Hillary became so popular that Clinton herself submitted her own caption to the website and invited its creators to meet with her at the State Department. Her star power and ability to capture the imagination of individuals around the world is one noteworthy aspect of her success.

Senator Kerry will likely succeed Hillary Clinton in early 2013. Her tenure as secretary of state is filled with accomplishments that taken together demonstrate the resurgence of U.S. diplomacy and restoration of American credibility. Her specific successes – such as Burma’s opening to the world or crippling effect of Iran sanctions – are important, but so too are her focus on people-to-people diplomacy and economics. Senator Kerry would do well to build upon Clinton’s impressive record once he moves over to Foggy Bottom.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared on PolicyMic

The pros and cons of each are discussed below:

1) Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) – The current Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considered by many to be the leading candidate to replace Clinton. He is a nearly three-decade veteran of the Senate and former Democratic Presidential nominee, as well as a distinguished voice on progressive foreign policy. Because of his Senate oversight responsibilities, Kerry knows the inner workings of the State Department well. He’s worked closely with previous Secretaries of State and Presidents alike. He also played a key role in shaping Obama’s policies, serving stints as an informal envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and reprised the role of Mitt Romney in the President’s debate preparations. His consideration for the post has been publically welcomed by Congressional Republicans – who know and respect him – but who also likely covet an opportunity to replace Kerry with a Republican in a special election for his would-be-open Senate seat. Former GOP Senator Scott Brown (R-Mass.), who lost a close and contentious race to Elizabeth Warren this November, would be a strong candidate to replace Kerry. If successful, Brown’s return to the Senate would complicate Democratic efforts to retain the seat and the party’s thin Senate majority.

2) Tom Donilon – President Obama’s National Security Advisor is often described as one of the most influential national security officials in the White House because of his close relationship with the President.  He previously served as the State Department Team Lead on Obama’s Transition Team and as Deputy National Advisor earlier in the Obama Administration. And in the Clinton Administration, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and subsequently as Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s Chief of Staff. Donilon is closely associated with many of the Administration’s foreign policy successes – including the Iran sanctions and the raid on Bin Laden – and has likely alienated certain Congressional Republicans, as a result. He is a foreign policy insider, but some question his ability to serve as the energetic (and public) face of U.S. foreign policy in the mold of Secretary Clinton. That said, if current White House Chief of Staff Jacob Lew is nominated and confirmed as the next Treasury Secretary, Donilon’s experience with the inner workings of the White House may make him a likely candidate to serve as a replacement.

3) Former Sen. Chuck Hagel – The current Co-Chairman of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and Georgetown Professor is a respected realist voice on foreign policy matters. A former two-term Republican Senator from Nebraska, he is a decorated Vietnam Veteran and fierce critic of the Iraq War, who broke with his party and endorsed President Obama in 2008. Hagel and Obama met each other during their service together in the Senate and Obama has turned to Hagel for advice on national security issues ever since. During his career in Congress, Hagel served on the Foreign Relations Committee (with Kerry) and the Special Intelligence Committee and amassed extensive knowledge and experience in national security matters. As a former Senator, Hagel has the public stature expected in a Secretary of State, but is reportedly the front-runner to replace Leon Panetta as Secretary of Defense.

4) William Burns – The current Deputy Secretary of State is the second-ever career Foreign Service Officer to serve in such a senior position. Burns was previously the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan and then Russia, and also served as Condoleezza Rice’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs (the number three position at the Department and traditionally the most senior position attainable for a career officer). He is well-respected by Democrats and Republicans alike for his foreign policy aplomb and leadership and was easily confirmed for his current post when Clinton nominated her long-time friend Wendy Sherman to replace him as Under Secretary. Burns is a dark horse candidate because he is not a political operative with a constituency that would support his candidacy and is not well known amongst the general public.  Also, only one previous career official – Lawrence Eagleburger – has ever served as Secretary of State and that was via a recess appointment that lasted only six weeks – until Warren Christopher was sworn in and replaced him.

It is evident that President Obama has several strong candidates to choose from to replace Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. While Kerry is the current front-runner in the race – due to his stature and support the Obama Administration’s foreign policies – only time will tell who will ultimately be tapped to assume this important role. None of the four candidates listed above is likely to provoke a contentious confirmation process – as Susan Rice may have – so the Administration has some flexibility with its choice.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow.

1. Michael Morell: 

The current Acting Director of the CIA is considered by many to be the leading candidate to replace Petraeus. He is a three-decade veteran of the CIA, who has held several senior management positions at the agency, including director for intelligence and deputy director. Morell knows the CIA well and has worked directly with previous CIA directors and presidents alike. He also played a key role in Obama’s intelligence successes to date, such as the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden. His close relationship with President Bush, which he forged when he was responsible for the president’s Daily Brief, and association with Bush-era interrogation practices, however, may complicate his chances. It is unclear how Morell’s background as an intelligence analyst – as opposed to an Operations Officer – will affect his candidacy.

2. John Brennan: 

The current deputy national security advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism is often described as the most influential intelligence official in the Obama administration because of his close relationship with the president. He served for 25 years as a CIA operations officer, including in senior postings throughout the Middle East and as director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Brennan was Obama’s original choice to serve as CIA director during his first term until he withdrew his name from consideration after Congressional Republicans threatened to use his confirmation hearings to explore his support for Bush-era interrogation practices. He directs U.S. counterterrorism policies, including the drone campaign and hunt for senior Al Qaeda operatives, from his White House office. It is unclear if Brennan would want to become CIA Director and be required to report to the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, instead of directly to the president.

3. Michael Vickers: 

The current under secretary of defense for Intelligence oversees all military intelligence programs, including the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, among others. He is a former Army Special Forces officer and CIA Operations officer with several decades of experience in intelligence circles. He is perhaps most well known for the key role he played arming mujahideen forces in Afghanistan in the early 1980s, which earned him a role in Charlie Wilson’s War (both the book and move adaptation thereof). He was intimately involved in the operation to kill Bin Laden – like Morell and Brennan – but was out of government and had no role in Bush-era interrogation practices. So he has less potential baggage associated with his prior intelligence service.

4. Jane Harman: 

The current president and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Harmon is a leading progressive voice on national security issues. She served in the Defense Department during the Carter Administration and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1993. During her 18-year career in Congress, Harmon served on the House Armed Services Committee, Intelligence Committee, and Homeland Security Committee and amassed extensive knowledge and experience in national security matters. She would be the first ever-female Director of the CIA, if nominated and confirmed.

President Obama has several strong candidates to choose from to replace David Petraeus as CIA Director. The White House will seek to avoid a potentially contentious confirmation process – that could accompany Brennan’s nomination (assuming he wants the new post, which is arguably less influential than his current one) or Harman’s (who is a partisan figured disliked by some Congressional Republicans). Morell and Vickers the most likely candidates to succeed Petraeus because both are career intelligence officials who have been intimately involved in many of the Obama Administration’s flagship intelligence policies. The CIA Director has traditionally not had the public persona of a Petraeus or a Panetta (or even a Harman or Brennan), so the president has the flexibility to choose Morell or Vickers, who are more experienced at operating behind the scenes instead of in the public eye.

Between Morell and Vickers, Morell is the likelier candidate because he is the current Acting Director of the CIA. Concerns about his CIA service during the Bush Administration are likely overblown because he is not believed to be one of the primary architects of the controversial enhanced interrogation procedures. His nomination would likely elicit bipartisan support and allow President Obama to focus his political capital on other potential nomination battles, including that of a new Secretary of State, should Secretary Clinton step down, as is expected.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow. This article originally appeared in PolicyMic

According to the World Bank, Iraq’s GDP increased 10% in 2011 and Iraq’s central bank forecasts continued 10% annual GDP growth over the next 3 years. Iraqi per capita GDP increased 7% in 2011 to $3900. Many Iraqis now have more disposable income to spend and Iraq’s entrepreneurs are successfully offering them new dining options – almost always blatant rip-offs of established Western brands.

The economic boom in Iraqi Kurdistan – the semiautonomous Federal Region in the North of the country (“Kurdistan”) — is even more pronounced. There, oil and gas development, foreign investment, and cross-border trade with Turkey are driving rapid GDP growth.  A construction wave has completely changed the skylines of Erbil and Sulaimaniyah – Kurdistan’s two largest cities – as new apartment buildings, office complexes, hotels, and malls have come online. In 2011, per capita GDP in Kurdistan was estimated to be 40% higher than in the rest of Iraq — $5,500. So Kurds, have even more new-found income to spend.

Erbil’s Majidi Mall houses many upscale Western brands, as well as an array of authentic fast food franchises, including: Fatburger, Coffee Bean, and Chester’s Chicken. The arguably more popular Erbil Family Mall, houses Iraq’s first Carrefour supermarket and also an amusement park. I took the picture below in the Majidi Mall food court during a business trip to Erbil in late August:

Like in Baghdad, franchise knockoffs are abundant in Kurdistan and include the creatively (or not so creatively) named: PJ’s Pizza, Burger Queen, Costa Rica Coffee, among others. This author’s unscientific sampling of food items from such restaurants notes their similarity in taste to items offered at the real franchises they imitate, suggesting that these knockoffs may have found a way into those franchises’ supply chains in neighboring countries.

Kurdistan’s malls and restaurants not only cater to local residents but also visitors from other parts of the country (as well as neighboring countries like Iran). Iraqis from Baghdad, Basra, and other cities are visiting Kurdistan in droves – attracted by its security, near 24-hour electricity, and other comforts – and comprise the majority of the estimated 2.5 million visitors that Kurdistan will welcome in 2012.

Iraqi visitors must enter Kurdistan via the Erbil or Sulaimaniyah airports or other checkpoints administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government. During the recent Eid holiday, the wait to clear the Kirkuk checkpoint – the major land crossing into Kurdistan from Iraq – was six hours, according to friend of mine whose family members passed through it.  In Erbil, there were not enough hotel rooms for the large number of Eid visitors and several hotels reportedly offered guests cots or mattresses to sleep in air-conditioned hallways for $40-$50 USD/per night (and even those sold out, too).  So there is no shortage of demand and opportunities for local businesses.

Despite Iraq’s economic growth and entrepreneurial spirit, serious challenges remain. As the AP story rightly points out, many of the largest Western franchises, including KFC, Pizza Hut, Burger King, and MacDonald’s are not yet ready to enter Iraq. Many view the continued political dysfunction in Baghdad and recent deterioration in security in Arab Iraq as signs for concern. Smaller franchises, however, are increasingly entering Iraq – almost always through Kurdistan – because they have a higher risk tolerance and are willing to target first the more stable, albeit smaller Kurdish market (supplemented by numerous tourists), instead of the larger Arab Iraqi one. Until Erbil and Baghdad work through their disagreements and overcome the gridlock that has defined Iraqi politics for the past 18 months, signs like the following one (taken during my recent trip), will, unfortunately, remain commonplace.

Eli Sugarman is a Truman Security Fellow.